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to Clinical Sociology 
Massimo Corsale 
Suor Orsola Benincasa University, Naples, 
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1. Introduction 
This question, although trivial as it could appear, is neither so easy to by-pass, nor so 
useless: as I hope to show a little later.  
Sociology consists, at first, of a lot of concepts (better: “ideal types”, according with Weber), 
statements, theories, all grounded on observations and reasoning. In other words, it consists 
of knowing something, but also of thinking about the reliability of the way we put together 
such concepts, statements etc. Exactly the same as other sciences do.  
According with a common sense shared by both laymen and most scholars, at the first level all 
kinds of knowledge are the outcome of some methodical actions aiming to reproduce within 
human mind some features of “reality”. At the second level, they come from a methodical 
reasoning aiming to “explain” the events observed. And finally, they consist of drawing some 
conclusions useful to forecast what could arrive in the future, more or less far.  
Some basic assumptions taken for granted are connected with such statements. The first one 
is that there is a “reality” existing behind and before our observations, independently on 
them; secondly, such reality is (or at least ought to be) rationally arranged to give place to a 
Kosmos, so as the ancient Greeks said. Then, human reason is able to catch such rational 
arrangements, because of a real similarity between both reasons: human and natural, 
subjective and objective. Finally, the three levels are “rationally” ordered according with the 
above hierarchy of priority: observing, explaining, forecasting. 
Philosophers have many different opinions about such statements, but anyway they 
couldn’t be demonstrated. Then I think it would be dangerous to build our knowledge on 
such unsettled grounds. Of course we can let laymen do so: indeed by this way they usually 
build a common sense knowledge permitting them to manage their everyday life. Moreover 
the same happened successfully along many centuries, before the modern pattern of science 
elaborated by Royal Society would be established. 
We know very well that such a pattern has been revised several times: during the 
Enlightenment, by the nineteenth century Positivists and the neo-Kantian philosophers, 
until the sophisticated discourses of  twentieth century epistemologists (see mainly the 
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sceptical thesis of the post-Popper ones, so as Feyerabend). Nevertheless there are, I think, 
good reasons to suspect that all these theories involve some metaphysic assumptions, 
generally not made explicit. The only basic feature we can assume as a solid ground  to 
build our discourses is that both modern science and sociology are someway kinds of critical 
knowledge: that means, according with the most philosophers, a knowledge involving 
reflexive thinking about its foundations and methods as well.  
In my opinion, we should first of all go back to the starting point of the so called modern 
science: when scholars decided to put apart from their field of research the end, the aim of 
the nature, and to pay attention only to the causes of natural phenomena. But refusing 
teleology involves to give no relevance to the sense of nature taken as a whole, as well as seen 
in its particular features. It seems to me that such a refuse should be maintained, in general, 
for the science, but on the other hand one should also deal with some consequences, that we 
could resume by speaking about the following three points. 
First of all, people can hardly survive without giving sense to their world of life (the little 
section of the universe they live in, then the persons, animals and things they find during 
their everyday life, as well as the set of ideas, beliefs, information they have at hand for 
managing their life). People know very well that behind their own world of life there is a big 
world, the very universe, within which their own one has to make sense. Therefore they 
cannot be satisfied only with a science taking for irrelevant the problem of the sense of the 
whole: then, facing such a state of things, some ones shut their eyes and carry on their lives 
in apnoea. Some other ones (particularly within secularized societies) are in quest of 
satisfaction by living from hand to mouth, enjoying as much as possible every single 
moment: in other words, by  living an aesthetic life (according to Kierkegaard). Finally there 
are some other ones who are in quest of sense by asking for it from religion. Only a few 
persons indeed are able to make sense by their own for their life, and that happens mostly 
by making a personal use of religious convictions. Then, generally speaking, we could point 
out that in the quest for sense religion plays a very important role. 
A second question concerns the difference between nature and human world, as to the 
relevance of the sense for scientific research. Questing for the sense of human world (taken 
as a whole) means  obviously to search for the place of such a whole within the universe: 
that’s exactly the same as to search for the sense of the universe itself (that modern science 
refused to do). But usually social sciences don’t pursue such an aim: they generally pay 
attention to specific features of human world, namely to human behaviour (individual, 
collective or institutional). That’s namely the same as Weber pointed out by speaking about 
a sociology concerned with human behaviour provided with a sense given by the actor himself. 
Then sociologists not only cannot put away the problem of the sense in the same way as 
physicists or chemists: on the contrary, they have to do namely with the sense, in some way. 
And moreover (so as philosophers and historians) they usually speak about science: in other 
words they make a meta-discourse where science and scientists are the object (and maybe this 
is the reason why such other members are so suspicious of sociologists: they could feel not 
so happy for being taken as an object).  
Indeed we are just now choosing an approach like that: we are going to speak about 
sociology, as well as about science (then taking the former as it would share the same nature 
as the latter).  
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Our very discourse deals with the reason why people would like to know something : because 
knowing is finally a social action, then it has to make sense (for the actor), which consists 
first of all (according with Weber) of the reason why they do so. We have already spoken 
about the common  idea of science as something reflecting the world outside within the 
human mind. And we have pointed out some doubts about the consistency of metaphysical 
foundations of such a thesis. But now we would like to skip such problem by putting down 
a new question: Why indeed people (including  scientists) do make an effort like that? The Italian 
poet Dante Alighieri during the XIVth  century put on the lips of Ulysses the famous speech 
about “virtute e conoscenza”: that means “human beings have not been created to live as 
animals, but to pursue virtue and knowledge”. Behind such a sentence we can find a 
philosophical reasoning as well a theological one, well mixed so as it usually happened 
during the Middle Ages. The sense  of mankind, that’s the reason why it has been created (by 
God: Who likely had just this intention, and then this waiting from His creature) is to pursue 
virtue and knowledge. Then for our Middle Ages ancestors the effort to learn always more, 
to build an ever growing knowledge, depends on a moral obligation. 
Nowadays on the contrary, after the scientific revolution of the XVIIth century, we can no 
longer take into consideration the sense of mankind, and namely a sense given it by God. A 
basic assumption of modern knowledge is not to need the hypothesis of God to explain 
anything in the world. Then we have to search for another explanation of the social practice 
named “knowledge”. 
2. From the wild life until institutions 
Knowledge is indeed a social practice, and science (together with sociology) is included 
within knowledge.  But what means to be a social practice? 
A practice indeed is whatever (human) activity aiming to manage the world of life, to satisfy 
some need by changing something, by solving some problem.  Of course, we know that all 
along the Western philosophical tradition people have distinguished the practical activity 
from the theoretical one: and knowledge has been considered as pertaining to the latter. But 
such a view, albeit very influential (have we to remind the two “reasons”, the theoretical 
and the practical one, separately examined by Kant?), implies many metaphysical 
presuppositions which are not only indemonstrable, but finally contrasting with a 
phenomenological overview of the process of building human knowledge. That we are 
going to show here below. 
Human life (something namely practical) flows always and overall within a social 
dimension. Never human beings lived all alone, running prairies and forests so as other 
wild beasts do: because they need to meet each other and share the efforts to gain what is 
necessary for collective surviving and to avert dangers coming from natural forces. In other 
words, they have to share social practices: i.e. making tools, hunting, caring kids and the 
elders, defending the group from enemies, etc. So as Durkheim pointed out, sharing 
working practices made societies consistent, that’s giving the ground of human solidarity. 
At this point we have to take note that no one, individual as well as human group, could 
survive  without interpreting the events arriving all around: that’s giving them a meaning as 
a sign of somewhat likely to arrive in a future, immediate as well as far. Animals too do 
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something like that: they can interpret signs of a coming tempest, as well as of an 
earthquake etc. But human beings don’t rely only upon their instincts (anyway not so strong 
as those of animals), but their interpretation of events needs fitting these ones within their 
context : in other words, giving them a sense.  
Sense is actually, indeed, the meaning of an event (considered as a message) within its own context. 
The same event, when it arrives in different contexts, has indeed different meanings: it could 
involve different consequences and give rise to different reactions from the part of the 
interpreter.   
The last sentence should be emphasized, because it can really help us to understand the 
sense of knowledge. Let we explain such a statement as it follows. 
- What means “to know something”?  It means to be able to give it a sense (i.e. a specific 
meaning: that coming from its relationships with its own context).  
- What means then “its own context”?  The net of events and phenomena drawing a 
picture where the object we are interpreting takes a specific role.  
- Why do we need to know such a picture?  Because, by enabling us to give a meaning to 
the object, it could help us to understand where it is coming from and what 
consequences could arrive from it. 
- Why is it so important, to forecast such consequences?  Because we need to organize 
just in time our reaction to the object, so that it couldn’t  overwhelm us, while, at the 
same time, we could be able to take advantage from it for our strategic behaviour. 
Then finally, knowledge has a very big role within our strategy of living: this is its specific, 
very practical sense. But such a sense could in no way be given individually, that’s by each 
individual  independently from the other members of  his (her) social context. Otherwise 
people could whenever disagree about managing what’s necessary to collective surviving. 
And that makes the difference with the usual idea of knowledge as a “mirror of the reality”. 
Someone could feel a scent of pragmatism in such a statement. Actually, it is not so far from 
pragmatism: which, from its part, flourished in the same Chicagoan context where 
American  sociology was born. But I think that the following difference from pragmatism 
ought to be emphasized. Pragmatism was coming directly from an Anglo-Saxon utilitarian 
outlook, with its materialistic taste, but anyway it was a philosophical theory, stating how to 
understand what happens in the world, from its point of view. Our statement, on the 
contrary, comes from a sheer observation of what happens within a specific field of 
experience, without drawing from it a general theory on the world. 
On the other hand, drawing the picture we spoke about involves a previous conceptual 
building where the things Aristotle and Kant named categories are methodically employed. 
Such conceptual buildings are systems of meanings, rules, social roles having the function of 
explaining what  happens in the practical experience, at the same time as they are ruling it.  
In other words, such conceptual buildings are what sociologists usually name institutions. 
To understand what happens in our world of life, we need to know previously the 
institutions governing such a world: otherwise, how could we give sense to what happens? 
But at this point one could ask:  how could people build institutions without having 
previously understood particular events of their world? This question deals with the so 
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called reflexivity principle, which many sociologists (as well as philosophers of science) so as 
Garfinkel and the ethnomethodologists have very much spoken about. 
I propose two ways to get off, phenomenologically,  from this paradox: the one philogenetic 
and the other ontogenetic. Let us begin with the first one. 
Primitive men saw the natural phenomena and gave them a sense, aiming to forecast what 
consequences these ones could involve for them. We don’t name this kind of knowing 
“science”, because of its very distance from the rules and the criteria of modern science. But it 
was something very different from the forecasting attitude of animals: events and phenomena 
related with the thing we are speaking about, and composing the picture giving it a sense, are 
not specific events and phenomena but abstract models of them, that’s concepts.  
Concepts are actually something not existing in nature: they exist only by a human mental 
working. But no work would be done having no real function for satisfying a need: 
otherwise, why should someone accomplish such a heavy task? Indeed what a need could 
be satisfied by building concepts? That of  drawing up one’s strategies for living. Human 
natural instincts are not enough to make such strategies safe, so as it happens with animals; 
but humans can employ their mind as a tool for gaining the same (or maybe a better) 
outcome.  
Mind is a very particular tool: it makes it possible, to keep as present something that is past, 
or could be future, or is far from our eyes, but also something abstract, that could never 
become perceivable by our senses. By keeping present such things, we are enabled to 
compare different experiences (real or virtual), and then to build empirical concepts. On the 
other hand, by employing abstract concepts (categories), we can establish relations between 
empirical concepts, and by this way we can build theories.  The system of theories built by 
human beings and shared within a human group represents their outlook over the world as 
a whole. This is true not only for primitive men, but for the overall mankind.  
As a matter of fact, such an outlook does in no way represent a mirror of the world, but 
rather an interpretation of it, a conceptual structure built within the community. The whole 
world we think to know, or we think existing independently on us, is finally no other thing 
but such system of theories, such outlook, such interpretation: and we can in no way go 
beyond it.  Moreover it does not hold sheer descriptions of its single features, but on the 
contrary it involves a lot of value judgements, of rules for using better the opportunities 
offered by that world. In other words, such an outlook represents the culture of the group. 
Single theories held within a culture are neither true absolutely, nor false: each one comes 
from repeated experiences compared with each other, and keeps its validity until a new 
experience could not confirm it. Tarski and Popper (and many other philosophers) speak at 
this concern of crashing with “facts”, but this involves having solved the metaphysical 
problem of the nature of such facts as well as that of our relation with such facts. On the 
contrary, phenomenologically we can say that single human beings living within groups 
make only experiences, they compare these ones with those of other members, and together 
with them they try to build socially shared theories over their common world of life. This is 
finally the social building of reality. That can also overcome the paradox of reflexivity, by this 
coming and going from new and old experiences, from concepts and theories keeping their 
validity and the necessity of building more suitable ones. 
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The ontogenetic way to overcome the reflexivity paradox deals, on the other hand, with the 
steps a single individual moves during his (her) biological and cultural development.  Little 
kids need not only to be fed but also to understand what happens all around them in order to 
organize their reaction to it, first of all by applying to parents for protection. The most effective 
protection adults can supply consists of  showing them the meaning of their world of life 
(common to adults and kids), beginning from that of each single object therein. “Meaning” is 
generally employed to signify the relation between a word and an object; but by that 
proceeding kids don’t learn only their mother-tongue: they learn mainly how to consider those 
objects (positive or negative, good or bad) and how to refer to them in case of need. So meaning 
becomes something relevant not only from a semantic, but also from a pragmatic point of 
view: it is closely related with the world of life, by the means of institutions. 
So as we saw shortly before, institutions are systems of meanings, rules, social roles having the 
function of explaining theoretically what could happen in the practical experience. Then they 
are first of all systems of meanings: politics, economy, religion, market, family are all examples of 
institutions able to give a specific meaning to behaviours connected with each of them.  
Little kids cannot understand immediately such systems, nor the system of these systems. 
As they go on by learning the meaning of single specific objects (things, events, behaviours 
etc.) they compare such meanings with each other and then they build concepts. Some years 
ago I had the occasion to observe a little boy one year old, having had prior experience of 
dogs named collectively “bau”; such boy, paying attention to a picture representing a bird, 
stated it was a “bau”: so he had built the concept of “animal”, by  setting together birds and 
dogs at least. 
Could we consider such a concept, built by this way, as “right” or “true”? I think this is a 
really  misleading question. Actually humans (including the kids)  build their concepts each 
one by himself, and each one tests the “rightness” of his (her) work by making use of it to 
understand messages coming from the world of life. “Understanding” means giving a 
meaning to the message, rather a specific meaning connected with the actual circumstances 
where the message is given out: in other words, “understanding” means giving a sense to a 
message. People consider “right” the sense given to a message when, by relying on it, the 
outcome of their behaviour is not deceiving. In case of deception, indeed, they have to 
amend their mental building in order to implement its fitness. And so on: to understand 
messages (that’s all kinds of information coming from outside), people employ reflexively 
concepts they have at their disposal, but new experiences compel them to amend and 
implement again and again their conceptual patrimony. That is by no way “true” or “false”: 
it is (considered by the actor) fit or unfit to understand successfully the world of life. But the 
same road is covered also by scholars, who by this way contribute to make up the complex 
building of science: we will come back later to this specific concern.  
From all this discourse comes, evidently, that concepts are not built only to reproduce the 
external world inside one’s own mind: why indeed should we make such a duplication of 
the world? This process of building comes, on the contrary, from our need of organizing 
(Weick). Organizing means to single out an aim to reach and to arrange suitable means in 
order to pursue it. Singling out as well as arranging some means involves a prior 
typification (Schutz) of single experiences: then building empirical concepts. But organizing 
is not an accidental behaviour: people (both adults and kids) organize something in order to 
satisfy some needs; so concepts too depend on needs. 
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Need is a key concept in behavioural sciences. Usually it is considered a psychological one, 
as needs are studied as elements making up the structure of human mind. But the concept of 
need can also be grounded on common sense as a starting point for all behavioural sciences. 
We know very well indeed how much this makes sense for economics. Then, why couldn’t 
it be the same for sociology?  
As a matter of fact, human life as a whole is an acting process: we are what we do, also when it 
seems that we are doing nothing at all. Whatever action is anyway an answer to some need: 
but needs, as manifold as they appear, can at any rate be assembled in two big categories: 
those aiming to survival (of the individual as well as of the species), on the one hand, and 
those aiming to get recognition from the part of other members of society, to gain more and 
more implementation of  his (her) own personal identity, on the other hand. People don’t 
need simply eating, sleeping or making love; they also strongly need to see their Me well 
appreciated by the Generalized Other (Mead). A good appreciation from the part of members 
of our social group can reassure us that our life is going on the right way, and that we could 
get protection in case of need. 
Emphasizing such second category of needs is something of great moment. The most 
widespread opinion (among laymen, but among scholars too, beginning with Weber) about 
the dynamic of social action is that it is moved by reason and/or social rules in the better 
cases, or by passions in the worse ones. On the one hand, maybe laymen are right when they 
put a rigid opposition between “good action” (that inspired by reason and/or social rules) 
and “bad action”: communities hardly could survive without widely shared convictions 
about what is right and what is wrong for public welfare. 
But, in my opinion, scholars and especially social scientists have to penetrate somewhat 
more inside the question. Coming back once again to little kids, we have yet stated they 
learn the meanings concerning their world of life not only from a semantic, but also from a 
pragmatic point of view. This means that they don’t learn only the names of objects (things, 
events and situations, humans and animals, etc.) but also how to manage them: in other 
words, the meanings are so closely related with the rules for using objects denoted, that the 
former ones could also be identified with the latter. All socialization processes finally consist 
of learning meanings with rules: “this has to be made so and so”, “this other in not so good 
to be done”, “It is better to go to sleep and to awake pretty earl”, and so on. 
By socialization practices new generations are informed about the culture shared within their 
community, that’s the whole of institutions, meanings and rules in use therein. But at this 
point I suggest to pay attention to the fact that information doesn’t mean the same as 
interiorization. According with Parsons, socialization, the only social practice assuring social 
order (in opposition to the Hobbes’s Leviathan), consists of interiorization, from the part of 
members, of all values shared within the community: otherwise people may be considered at 
risk of deviance, and society at risk of trouble. “Interiorization of values” indeed means that 
people not only know their existence, but share them so far as they get ready to inspire their 
behaviour.  
The inconvenience of this theory is that such an hyper-socialized member (Granovetter) 
doesn’t exist at all. While, on the other hand, it would be not so welcome, as it would be 
only consistent with a “plastered” society. But fortunately it is actually impossible, because 
of the following reasons. 
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Coming back once again to the little kids, we said that they learn the meaning of objects 
composing their world of life, in order to become able to manage them conveniently. To this 
end such meanings have to incorporate rules concerning the management of the related 
objects. Rules are indeed prescriptions implying value judgements. Parsons and the most 
sociologists after him have employed the term “value” to mean the good principles 
inspiring human societies and permitting them to reduce social conflict in order to live in 
peace. In my opinion, according with the most philosophers, it would be more exact to mean 
by the term “value” only a particular kind of concepts: those related with 
“positive/negative” or “better/worse” criterion, instead of  that of “true/false”; so that 
value judgements actually involve a choice concerning a behaviour (actual or virtual), 
otherwise than factual ones. Then, a meaning involving a value judgement could be better 
named cultural pattern: as a matter of fact, the concept of pattern involves a favour, an 
attitude fair to choice, while meanings theoretically are indifferent to choice (though 
practically they are usually embodied within cultural patterns). 
Socialization finally consists of conveying the culture of old generations to younger ones, 
beginning by a lot of cultural patterns: “this behaviour is allowed”, “this other one is 
forbidden”, “this can be made this way”, “in such situations well educated people do so…”, 
etc. But phenomenologically it would be better to distinguish socialization from the point of 
view of “teachers” on the one hand, and of “pupils” on the other. The first one consists of 
giving “pupils” the fittest information about the world of life shared by the both (teachers 
and pupils): that involves giving rules for managing it “conveniently” (from the point of 
view of the teachers); and it is supported by the hope that pupils will make a good use of 
such information. One could suppose that Parsons’s theories about the matter started from 
this point of view. 
But in my opinion the more interesting point of view is that of pupils. As far as they get 
ready to pay attention, they will keep information they are receiving; but this doesn’t mean 
that they would like to interiorize it. In any case, at first they likely feel troubled by the new 
things they should memorize, mostly because of the new obligations there involved, but 
generally by becoming less free. We have not to bypass too quickly such children’s 
reactions, because adults too have just the same reaction when they face some new 
information. Everyone would like to avoid any complication of his (her) outlook on the 
world; then as they cannot anyway reject such new information, they get engaged to 
demonstrate that there is no new matter: they still knew it since  a long time, and had 
always behaved consistently with it (they think). 
Actually there is no fault in this defence mechanism: indeed it is very important, in order to 
diminish the complexity of the world, and to allow an easier management of it. Otherwise 
we would be overwhelmed by a redundant complexity. Even the basic philosophical 
principle “entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem” is grounded on the same logic. 
Anyway what is important to mind is to keep a good balance between such a disposition to 
simplification, on the one hand, and the necessity to improve more and more our outlook on 
the world, in order to better understand it, on the other one. 
As a matter of fact, fortunately kids are anyway pretty well balanced between these two 
attitudes: idleness on the one hand, and curiosity on the other, both stress them to take the 
right way, that consists of making a selection. In order to get over their first rejecting 
attitude, they indeed take into consideration the usefulness of the proposals they receive for 
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solving problems connected with their everyday life. While, at the same time, they keep in 
mind that the other ones too have some bad consequences in case of infringement. So inside 
the mind of each single kid (as a paradigm of what happens also within grown-up people) 
the proposals coming from the “teachers” grow to form two groups. The first one includes 
the cultural patterns which have not (yet) been considered useful to solve problems 
interesting the subject. Who hence gets ready to decide case by case whether to enforce the 
rule there embodied, in order to avoid the bad consequences of non-conforming to it, or on 
the contrary, to face (the risk of) such bad consequences as a price for pursuing anyway 
some ends more important for the subject. But in any case we must emphasize that this 
group of cultural patterns has not been interiorized by the subject, so that they don’t become 
for him (her) a stimulus to act. Conforming to them or not, is the outcome of an 
opportunistic choice, so that when there are chances enough to escape their bad 
consequences, infringement would become very likely.   
In the second group of cultural patterns everyone sets up those that he (she) has had the 
chance of testing positively: he (she) has tried that such patterns supply good ways to get 
ends he (she)  was searching for. By repeating the experience, such patterns can become 
something which the subject refers to as good and dutiful: at first, dutiful as necessary in 
order to get wanted ends, but in the long run, right dutiful. At this point they have been 
interiorized. 
During the early childhood such patterns are concerned mainly with biological life: eating, 
sleeping, controlling sphincters, etc. But as the subject grows up he (she) does more and 
more feel new needs of self-recognition, especially from the part of parents and of close 
relations. Then enforcing the proposed cultural patterns becomes for him (her) a way to get 
the favourite kind of recognition.   
Transactional analysts, so as Berne, have spoken about two main kinds of childish attitudes 
(often kept up also by grown people): the one characterizing a type named adapted kid, and 
the other one the type of rebellious kid. The both are searching for recognition from the part 
of members of their reference group (parents and relations, playmates, etc.), but the adapted 
ones make it by confirming explicitly the rules coming from  the grown-up people, while the 
rebellious ones aim to be recognized as more independent individuals both by grown-up 
people and by their playmates.  
Taking for granted that people are usually inclined to keep their childish choice also when 
they grow up, we can point out that the choice between the above attitudes depends on a 
prior attitude pertaining to the subject: indeed somebody prefers getting recognition first of 
all through an immediate approval from the part of grown-up members of their family and 
of their milieu as well; whilst somebody else prefers getting it indirectly, by imposing on the 
whole milieu their personality as playing a relevant role within the context. 
In any case, the both types can attain to a good standard of socialization when the 
interiorized cultural patterns become for the subject a source of moral suasion impelling to 
action in the same way as needs: indeed  they become a sort of needs. 
It is worth emphasizing this last statement: interiorized cultural patterns can perform as 
needs, in order to stimulate action, because of their close relationships with the actor’s aim 
of being positively recognized. By whom? First of all by the Generalized Other (Mead): 
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members of the actor’s milieu so as the actor himself could think at them. But at the same 
time, a positive recognition must come from the actor himself, as far as he (she) could feel 
his (her) own identity empowered by enforcing such patterns.  
The theory here outlined could actually account for the Weber’s twofold rationality, 
especially for the one related with values: which indeed has been only enunciated without 
any explanation, from the part of Weber, about the logic that should inspire human non-
utilitarian behaviour.  
The same theory could however also account for the relationships between the two 
dimensions of culture: the individual and the collective one. Some pages before we have still 
spoken about culture, but without specifying which dimension we were referring to: since it 
is well  known that people in their everyday life often speak about “enriching one’s own 
culture”, where “culture” is identified with the whole “knowledge” of a single person. 
While scholars, on the other hand, usually speak about culture as an inheritance of a whole 
community. 
Actually however, there is no inconsistency between the two points of view. As a matter of 
fact, culture is something mental, it consists of some contents of mind: then it couldn’t stay 
outside of the mind of single persons. And we have yet indirectly analyzed the process of 
building a culture inside of a single’s mind. At first a kid, but later a grown-up too, they 
constantly receive messages from the world outside; messages consisting of some 
information about the state of things, including also cultural patterns. This means that he 
(she) gets informed not only about the objective situation of things, but also about opinions 
and preferences of the Generalized Other, that’s of the people living within the same milieu: 
opinions and preferences that people have set up formerly by having made experiences, and 
tried reactions together with their consequences, and having compared all this with 
experiences of other members. In other words, by this way our subject gets informed about 
the actual culture of the whole community where he (she) lives and grows up.  
So culture becomes a collective inheritance of a community, that’s the outcome of 
experiences of all members, shared and compared with one another, and related with needs 
individually as well as collectively felt. Whereas collective needs are needs individually felt 
by the most of members of a community, and then considered “right”: so that behaviours 
aiming to satisfy them give place to shared cultural patterns. Whilst individual needs can 
have the same outcome only if they are consistent with the satisfaction of collective ones: 
otherwise they give place to negative cultural patterns.  
Of course we yet know that culture is no mirror of a (supposed) pre-existing reality; now we 
see that it’s rather a knowledge oriented to the action: information about the state of things 
in the world, but also patterns of action; and then it may be described not only by assertions, 
but also by prescriptions. 
Why do we need just such kind of knowledge?  Because the world is not something similar 
to a (traditional) classroom, where pupils ought to put in their mind some information 
without realizing its usefulness. On the contrary, since the beginnings of mankind people, 
thrown in their world of life, have been obliged to essay to survive, and in order to achieve 
such an end people have tried to understand what happened all around them: that means to 
give each event the “right” place within the whole image people had of the world around 
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(their world of life). The place of an event indeed may be “right” if people know what 
normally precedes such kind of events and what follows, as well as what consequences it 
might make for the people themselves, and how far they could control the whole process. In 
other words, to understand is to give a meaning: where one could suggest to employ the 
word “meaning” to denote the “right place” of a whole kind of events, while it would be much 
better to employ the word “sense” to denote the particular meaning of a specific event within 
its own context. Since a specific context could influence very deeply the real meaning of an 
event, as we all could see very well, looking at our everyday life: it would be enough to put 
our mind to the difference between an event so as a kiss in general, and that given Jesus by 
Jude. 
In order to organize any kind of strategic behaviour, we need to know as much meanings 
and senses of events likely to happen in our world of life. So we need culture: a culture that 
we have built by ourselves, by our own experiences, but much more by putting together the 
information coming from people around as well as from books and other media. In other 
words, we need a personal culture, but something that is mostly shared by the members of 
our milieu, with a little part specific to each different subject. In the most cases such a 
personal dimension of culture is not so noteworthy: people share with the other  members of 
their milieu almost all cultural patterns really relevant for the everyday life (the only one 
interesting such members). There are indeed some cases (usually those of scholars or of 
other persons intellectually creative) where that personal dimension of culture is so relevant 
that it influences their whole outlook on the world: from here comes the ongoing 
implementation of collective culture (the progress of science etc.). 
Such a process is in no way typical of modern societies; on the contrary, it characterizes all  
phases of human history. Primitive men too, facing events influencing their survival, needed 
to understand the sense of them: where did they come from, and what consequences could 
they produce for themselves. The first kind of explication and understanding of events 
(natural as well as human) was religious: religion was the first institution  created by 
primitive communities. 
That of institution is maybe the basic concept in sociology; certainly it is the most cited, but 
often not so well definitely. First of all, an institution is a system of meanings carrying out (at 
least) a function relevant in order to influence positively or negatively the steadiness of the social 
system as a whole. Where it would be better to remind that a system is a set of elements (material 
or immaterial) each one of which carries out a function relevant for the whole set.  
Maybe someone could be astonished by finding some explicit references to concepts as 
system and function within a discourse inspired by a phenomenological approach. But we 
have to remember that sociology is in no way a philosophical system: it consists of a set of 
theories (the so called social theory) having the function to support the understanding of 
social phenomena with their mutual relationships. And in order to pursue such an aim 
sociologists can employ all useful concepts, which are mere instruments, no metaphysical 
realities.  
On the other hand, as we observe our definition at close, we have to emphasize that a 
function doesn’t necessarily play a positive role for the steadiness of the system (so as 
functionalist sociologists generally take for granted).  On the contrary it could also play a 
negative one, so as it happens for example in the case of gangs of offenders: they too being 
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institutions, in their way. But at last we couldn’t forget that many scholars so as Foucault, 
Erikson and most labelling theorists, have emphasized the role of deviance for 
strengthening the social cohesion: where the boundaries between positive and negative role 
are put seriously in doubt (fortunately). 
In our perspective, institutions are neither coercive, nor super-individual subjects 
compelling humans to behave in some ways fixed in advance: as a system of meanings, they 
are instruments created by the humans themselves to support their understanding of states 
of things in order to allow them to better organize their strategic behaviour. 
First of all, institutions supply humans with meanings denoting classes of events: then, 
generic meanings. But in second and more realistic place, a combination of different classes 
of events coinciding in the same situation supply the specific meaning of a particular event, 
its sense. At this point, we ought to pay attention to the fact that among such events 
coinciding in the named situation there is also the Self of the actor interpreting the same 
situation, a Self with its image of the world, its personal culture, its specific ends to pursue. 
Then it contributes to form the context, the frame (to employ the term fortunately introduced 
by Goffman). So the sense given to the named situation is somewhat personalized, and by 
this way the institution itself is really influenced: another way to contest a functionalistic, 
coercive conception of institutions.  
We still told that primitive humans tended to interpret (that’s: to give sense) the most events 
by referring to the religious institution: for them, all the meanings of natural events, as well 
as  human ones, were connected with religion, as far as humans are not able to control 
natural ones (and then they have to be controlled by much stronger forces). While human 
behaviour have to be not contradictory with such stronger forces.  
During the following phases of human development, different institutions became 
independent on religion: politics, economics, law, art, knowledge (formerly philosophical, 
later scientific). Such process is named laïcization, that means reciprocal independence of the 
different systems of meaning. While by secularization (a process that we ought not to mistake 
for the former one) the religious outlook over the world tends to loose importance, until 
becoming irrelevant. 
When we put laïcization in relationship with the constructivist perspective before illustrated 
(where knowledge isn’t mirroring an external “reality”, but interpreting experiences by 
building theories for giving sense to them), then we could infer some relevant consequences. 
Berger and Kellner have very well analyzed the modern mind as “homeless”, while formerly 
Max Weber had spoken about a “values polytheism” referring to modernity. The real reason of 
such lack of firmness, much more than the cultural relativism connected with the present trend 
to globalization, is the (unavoidable) pluralism of different systems of meaning (institutions), 
each one of which involving a specific outlook on the whole world. For example, the religious 
quest for sense of the universe cannot be confronted and made consistent with the scientific 
perspective: none of them is “right” nor “wrong”, each one must be considered within its own 
institutional context. Philosophers of the Middle Ages spoke about a theory of  “double truth”: 
that’s really inconsistent only when we think at the truth as an external reality existent 
independently on us. But it becomes plainly consistent when the truth is considered only as 
“consistency with facts” (Tarski) or better (as we have pointed out) with experiences. Where 
experiences (the same experiences) could be interpreted within different contexts (frames) 
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pertaining to different institutions. Then, to sum up, creationism could be rejected from a 
scientific point of view, but accepted from a religious one (the one legitimated to make a quest 
for sense of the universe). 
Institutions indeed are not only that macro-systems of meanings about which we have 
spoken so far. They are also smaller systems produced inside of each macro-system, and 
then smaller and smaller ones, as a set of Chinese boxes. For example, education is an 
institution inside of knowledge, universities and schools are institutions inside of education, 
etc. Market is an institution inside of economics, banks and stock exchange are institutions 
inside of market, etc. The whole of our world of life is enveloped by a thick net of 
institutions, but this is in no way a restriction of our freedom: on the contrary, it allows us to 
give a meaning to all our behaviours and to inform others that we are doing so. Sometimes 
maybe we would prefer not to inform others about our behaviour, and then we try to do it 
secretly; but generally social interaction needs an effective circulation of such information, 
mediated by institutions. Sociologists pertaining to the school of symbolic interactionism think 
at the  society as grounded on interaction mediated by symbols; but symbols are meanings, 
that need to be integrated within a system: in other words, within an institution. Without 
institutions we would be unable to give sense to our behaviour, or more or less to our 
everyday life, as far as they supply the best ways to realize all kinds of good social practices, 
or to avoid all kinds of dangerous ones.  
3. The institution sociology within the institution knowledge 
Now it should be better to come back to our first question: can sociology help us to live a 
better life? But  in order to answer such a question we should at first solve some preliminary 
problems.  
Pointing out that institutions supply the best ways to realize all kinds of social practices, it’s 
evident that to live a better life depends on which social practices we have to realize: for 
example, legal or criminal ones. And it depends as well on which relationships we have 
with such social practices: for example, whether we are gangsters or good citizens. But 
generally speaking and adopting in this case a relativistic attitude, we can say that they can 
help us, some way, to live a better life.  
But then, is sociology an institution? If so, is it a good or a bad one? And in any case, in 
which way could sociology help us to live a better life? But at last, what means “to live a 
better life”? As we could see, the question is manifold and not plain. 
We can start from the fact that knowledge is an institution. “Knowledge” corresponds to the 
Greek term Sophia, the friends of which have been named philosophers. In ancient Greece 
during the classic period (since the VI century b.C.) for the first time someone tried to detect 
the nature in order to give sense to the world around without referring to religion. Formerly 
in Greece, so as by all other known civilizations, only religion gave sense to the world, and 
only the priests were authorized to interpret it. Among the first philosophers, all laymen, 
some ones were also mathematicians (Thales, Pythagoras), while Chaldean mathematicians 
were priests. So in Greece mathematics and philosophy were for the first time considered 
features of a laïc knowledge. Until it circulated within a closed social milieu, this kind of 
knowledge was considered not so dangerous. But when Socrates began to spread this new 
critical attitude, he was  convicted for corrupting Athenian youth: actually he was showing 
www.intechopen.com
 
Sociological Landscape – Theories, Realities and Trends 
 
156 
them the possibility to refer to a truth not depending on religion. And by this way he was 
disconcerting young people as far as they were  trying the first experience of the Weberian 
Entzeuberung of the world. But at last the game was over: laïcization of knowledge was 
made. 
Starting from the first Greek philosophers until Newton and even longer, the word 
“philosophy” has been synonymous of “high knowledge” (to distinguish it from the “low 
knowledge” of  peasants, craftsmen and housewives). Christian theologians and 
philosophers have tried, since the first centuries of Christendom, to reconcile philosophy 
with religion, and mostly to reabsorb the former within the latter. But at last the both 
remained reciprocally independent, for the sources as well as for the style of reasoning, 
notwithstanding the fact that the both aimed to give sense to the world as a whole. So when 
philosophers, during the Renaissance and the earl Modern Age, began to put aside the 
problem of the sense of the world by abolishing teleology (the discourse concerning the ends 
of the nature), modern science came into the world as a new kind of knowledge, really 
different from both philosophy and theology. 
This description of the birth of modern science, though the best known in the schools, might 
be considered too plain, somewhat trivial as far as historians of science could tell a story 
much more complicated. We can only say, at this concern, that we haven’t described the 
historical process of its coming into the world, but rather that of the ideal type (Weber) of 
modern science. Then we couldn’t anywhere try realized the perfect theoretical model of 
modern science, corresponding to the one above illustrated, but we can single out only some 
relevant features of it. 
First of all, we can state that, according with such ideal type, science would share with 
knowledge in general the basic couple of values they refer to: the couple true/false. As a 
matter of fact, indeed, when we want interpret a statement from the point of view of the 
institution knowledge, we have to ascertain whether it is true or false (not true). But when we 
refer to truth within our discourse we have to pay attention to the context where such 
discourse is placed: when the context refers mainly to the institution religion, truth is strictly 
related with God and His messages; when it refers mainly to metaphysics taken as a chapter 
of philosophy, truth is related with some kind of reality existing somewhere with a nature 
independent on us and on our relationships with it. In both cases truth pertains to somewhat 
real (God or Nature, or Nature as God: Spinoza). But this is an hypostatical use of a concept 
that originally refers to the speech, not to things or persons: so a more suitable use of truth is 
that of the common sense, when for example we say “it is true that it rains”, or “it is true 
that I had a headache”, or “please, say the truth!”. The common sense use of the concept of 
truth, indeed, is strictly related with the so called low knowledge, since the craftsmen’ world 
of life as well as  that of housewives are overall included in the everyday life.  
The common sense statements are strictly empirical: they are true until a new experience 
give them the lie. Could the same be said with regard to the statement by the logic Tarski 
“Snow is white only if and until snow is white”? I’m not sure. Because Tarski  refers to the 
fact that snow is white, and the same do all those empiricist philosophers that Lakatos 
names positivists: according with whom statements are true if, and only if they are proved by 
facts. But only a metaphysical assumption could authorize us to presuppose a relationship 
between speeches and facts (existing somewhere independently on us). While we wouldn’t 
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face the same problem if we speak about experiences instead of facts: because experiences 
pertain to our world of life independently on the reality of the things there involved.   
Why do empirical common sense statements seem to be fit, while logical and more generally 
scientific ones give no confidence when grounded on a sheer empirical basis? Because of 
their difference from the point of view of the respective pragmatic functions. The later 
presuppose a mirroring function of mind and, consequently, of the speech: then they imply 
a metaphysical involvement in the problem of reality. Whilst the former can be verified or 
falsified only by everyday experience: if you ground your behaviour on a false statement, 
you cannot pursue your aim. Stop!  
Could a scientist adopt the same criterion? Of course: since he (she) would agree about 
taking his (her) statements only as interpretations of the state of things in order to carry on 
some new step of his (her) project (for example, some new step of the research he (she) is 
working about). From this point of view, true doesn’t mean corresponding to the reality (or to 
facts), but rather fit to pursue our aim. 
On the other hand, Lakatos told us that many scientists and philosophers, among whom 
some  physicists as Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, thought that scientific theories are neither true 
nor false, but simply conventions working as instruments (whence such an attitude is named 
conventionalism). Someone could note a close resemblance between such conventionalism 
and our pragmatic empiricism (the foregoing theory). Actually there is some resemblance, 
but we have to mind also important differences between the both: conventionalism deals 
mainly with theories (systems of statements describing a phenomenon); while pragmatic 
empiricism deals not only with theories but also with basic statements (describing single 
experiences). Moreover (and more important), conventionalism considers theories only as 
instruments for forecasting: that’s essentially to know the future, to reproduce a (future) reality in 
our mind; whereas pragmatic empiricism looks mainly at action. 
But anyway, putting aside the pragmatic dimension, the both outlooks share the same thesis 
about knowledge, and particularly about science: that scientific theories haven’t to be 
considered true nor false, but only fit or unfit (to preview some effects, or to gain some 
outcomes). At last we could also say that our pragmatic empiricism is a variant of 
conventionalism, where the value truth is assimilated to fitness, so as it happens in the 
everyday speech. 
Truth, on the other hand, has no better chance by other philosophical schools, different from 
the ones we have just spoken about. For example, according with anarchist theories à la 
Feyerabend, science has had an important political function during the first centuries of 
Modern Age, when it has contributed to destroy the traditional, well arranged idea of 
universe, the Kosmos of the Greeks or the Creation of God. But nowadays it has become a big 
business and an arena where different theories and schools struggle each other against, for 
prevailing independently on the respective relation with truth. According with Feyerabend, 
epistemological anarchists seem as Dadaïsts, but we could add that they renew some well 
known attitudes of ancient Sophists. In any case, they radically undervalue the quest for 
truth, but by their relativism they bar the way to any effort to introduce some order (as 
conventional as it may be) within the complex and complicated world we live in.  
These remarks about epistemological anarchism couldn’t anyway stop us from admitting 
that science, becoming a big business, has only shown more clearly a phenomenon really 
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concerning the whole history of high knowledge. One could ask indeed how far through the 
history the truth principle has worked as a sheer justification (or mystification) of interest 
and power clashes: for example between philosophical schools in ancient Greece, or during 
the rising of the Royal Society, or around the awarding of Nobel Prizes. According with 
Lakatos, Polanyi has to be considered the strongest supporter of this “authoritarian” view 
over the history of science: it’s a matter of fact that to establish which scientific theory has to 
prevail implies a power role; while on the other hand, to get so recognized involves winning 
a relevant role of power. 
Such authoritarian view is considered by Lakatos as one of the philosophical theories 
concerning the relation between science and truth; but in my opinion it is much more a 
sociological than a philosophical view over science and its history. And as a sociological theory 
it points out some absolutely real phenomena, even if it doesn’t face the problem of the nature 
of truth (a philosophical one) nor that of its function in the society (a sociological one). 
While on the other hand it helps us to point out the sociological nature of (high) knowledge 
and of science, taken as institutions. Indeed pre-modern philosophy was an institution, 
inside which there were other institutions so as the Platonic Academy, the ancient schools of 
rhetoric, the universities of the Middle Ages, etc. But also the new science is an institution, 
with its system of meanings and its new particular institutions: the Royal Society, the 
laboratories, the new scientific academies, later the policlinics, and overall the universities. 
All these particular institutions can be summed up to give place to the so called Scientific 
Community: the supreme judge over the outcomes of all subjects working within science, 
from the utterances of which comes the sense of all their work in general, as well as the 
meaning of each particular behaviour of theirs. 
A philosopher of science aiming to establish the best criteria for pursuing the truth may be 
much troubled by such discourse; but a sociologist has to interpret it as the way to 
understand what really happens (and likely couldn’t not happen) in the relationships 
between knowledge and society. Which actually can be interpreted as it follows. 
People build their culture each one by him(her)self, so as we have seen above. Each personal 
culture consists of cultural patterns: in other words, ways to solve little and big problems of 
the everyday life, mostly meeting the approval of the referring social group.(By the way, we 
could point out that this is the reason why it is so difficult to rescue deviant people, when 
they live their everyday life within a social milieu where their deviant cultural patterns are 
shared by the most other members). The process by which the content of a personal culture 
becomes widespread inside its milieu is imitation of successful patterns: there is no need of 
so much discourse, nor verbal elaboration and conceptualization, because imitation of a 
concrete successful behaviour is enough. 
But all this happens within the boards of everyday life; primitive societies, where almost all 
experiences of each member took place within the everyday life, and where social 
communication was quite face to face, were characterized by fully shared cultural patterns. 
As societies are becoming more and more complex, on the contrary, people make different 
experiences and give them a different sense; then they begin to need to compare each other 
their cultural patterns, and by this way to build a collective culture. But the last one is 
always somewhat different from those pertaining to each one of the single members of the 
community.  
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A single member could feel uncomfortable with some of his (her) own patterns, because it 
seems to be unfit to pursue the expected aim. In such case, he (she) could compare this 
pattern with the collective culture, and then he (she) could look for modify it in order to 
make it more fit; but he (she) could also engage him(her)self for a change in the collective 
culture (that’s a very hard political task, indeed). When social change becomes more and 
more fast, and local communities are put in always closer relationships with a bigger 
context, even with a global one, then confusion of patterns becomes very likely, deception of 
expectations is very frequent and discontent is widespread.  
Such discontent dips its roots within the global social and cultural change, but it is felt at last 
by single people or little groups within their world of life. For them it becomes a social 
problem.   
Very often such discontent is considered as a kind of mental trouble and moves a 
psychological intervention. But usually its real roots don’t plunge in a mental disease: on the 
contrary, they refer to social phenomena which can be studied and understood in their 
mutual relationships. And this is indeed a sociological task.  
That’s the reason why just during the first decades after industrial revolution, people 
needed for the first time some kind of knowledge which could help to understand, by 
scientific methods, the increasing social change consequent to that big phenomenon. And 
Comte proposed to name it “sociology”. That’s also the reason why during the XX century 
the rushing increase of social change gave a so strong impetus to sociological knowledge: 
sociologists have the task of studying the relationships between social phenomena (or also 
between other kinds of phenomena and at least one social phenomenon) in order to give 
them a sense.  
European sociologists at first paid the most attention to the big social phenomena, in order 
to map out the mega-trends of human development. So their work remained very close to 
that of historians, on the one hand, and to that of social philosophers on the other one. Later 
(namely in America with the Chicagoan school) sociologists turned their attention to local 
social problems by empirical research, but mostly with a descriptive approach. R.K. Merton 
the first, at the middle of XX century, tried to connect each other theory and research, 
proposing to develop theories of middle range, able to help us to better explain particular 
social problems. But afterwards sociologists have not always followed such very wise 
proposition. 
Nevertheless, they continue to face day by day social problems: situations where people feel 
uncomfortable with something related with their social context. That makes an important 
difference between sociology and other (hard) sciences. When sociologists don’t want to 
map out a big historical-theoretical picture of human development, they must not take the 
themes upon which to make research from the work (theoretical as well as empirical) of 
preceding sociologists (so as it happens with physicists, chemists or mathematicians), but 
rather from direct or indirect experience of actual and present social problems. As a matter 
of fact they are almost all clinical sociologists: that’s sociologists aiming to give people 
actually an answer enabling them to better face their difficult situation. 
But sociologists are neither physicians nor thaumaturgists: they only manage a scientific 
knowledge which aims to make understandable the relationships between different 
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phenomena in society. How could such a knowledge help people to solve their problems? 
How, finally, should a clinical sociologist work? 
To answer such a question we have first of all to remember that sociology doesn’t pertain to 
the low knowledge, to that usually employed by the members in their everyday life: as a 
matter of fact indeed, ordinary members of a community think about their problems in their 
turn, and often build some kinds of theories about them. The way they build such theories is 
just the matter ethnomethodologists are mainly involved in. But if by this way ordinary 
people could well manage all their problems, nobody would have invented sociology.    
Then sociology must pertain to the high knowledge. We have still seen how much problems 
would arise about the nature of science and of its methodology; even more problems would 
arise about the question whether sociology is a real science or not. But I suggest not to take a 
definite party in this debate, because anyway, in my opinion, it is not so useful: scholars 
make their research and pursue some outcomes (often very important ones) independently 
on the answers given to that questions (and almost all philosophers of science agree about 
that).  
But in any case high knowledge must differ from the low one as to the rigour: its discourses 
can’t be made casually nor approximately; they can’t be built on sheer personal opinions, 
nor on some kind of wishful thinking. Rigour implies first of all a good faith from the part of 
the sociologist: he (she) has to take seriously the problem at stake in order to really help the 
social partner to feel fit with the answers given by sociology. In the second place, 
sociologists have to single out as much phenomena likely to be someway connected with 
that which gave rise to the problem, without deceiving him(her)self as well as the partner 
about the real cause of the problem: to seek the causes of a social phenomenon (then also of a 
problematic one) can be misleading, because social phenomena are usually so 
interconnected that the one can influence the other and vice-versa. Then actually we can 
only observe that a change in the one is very likely to modify the whole net of phenomena, 
but it is very difficult to forecast exactly how much and in which direction it will be 
modified. 
In third place, rigour in the sociological discourse implies to clear all the premises of each 
reasoning as well as all consequences that one could forecast as likely. Thus any partner of 
the sociologist, should he (she) be a colleague or a layman, can verify his agreement or 
disagreement by furnishing arguments for it. Confronting and comparing such discourses 
could bring to a final agreement, or to an explicit disagreement, but the both grounded on 
clear basis. 
Rigour is not only a moral rule for a scholar. In the case of a sociologist involved in solving 
some social problem it is necessary to avoid any kind of wishful thinking: that’s a real 
danger, one of the worst, for people managing or feeling pain. 
But rigour is not enough to implement a clinical approach in sociology, that is in its turn a 
condition for helping someone to live a better life. At this point sociologists have no remedy, 
no drug for directly helping partners feeling pain in the middle of a problematic situation. 
They only can resort to a technique still well known, coming from the professional 
experience of psychoanalysts: they too don’t use indeed any drug to face the disease of their 
patients.  
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This technique consists of making partners (patients for the psychoanalysts, members of a 
little or big community, for sociologists) conscious of the whole net of phenomena 
(variables) inside which the pain flows. At first this could increase the pain, but then 
professionals must intervene for helping to try some change in some point of the net where 
it is possible, and to experience the outcomes of such a change. 
For the members of a community (a big or a little one) consciousness not only of the whole 
net of variables defining their situation, but also of their power for influencing it in some 
direction, could be undoubtedly a factor of strengthening the identity of single members as 
well as of the group as a whole. Where identity is, at last, the image each one (single or 
group) has of his (her) Self compared with that they think Generalized Other have of the same 
Self (Mead, Corsale). While, in its turn, the content of such image consists at last, for the 
single members, of the net of cultural patterns (i.e. the personal culture) he (she) has 
interiorized during his (her) lifelong socialization. And for the groups or communities, it 
consists of the collective culture members have built by comparing each other and finally by 
sharing mutually cultural patterns coming from the members (among whom the leaders of 
the group play a main role).   
But coming back to our question posed at the beginning of our discourse, what is finally a 
good life? If one looks at a happy life, neither sociology nor anyone other could really help 
him (her) in such direction. But if one looks at a life with a strong and gratified identity, then 
sociology could really be useful. And namely clinical sociology. 
I said “could” and not “can”, because nobody can assure us that members of the community 
helped by sociologists are actually able to change their situation in a positive direction. But 
that derives from the human nature (of the members as well as of sociologists), to which 
almightiness is not granted.  
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